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By ROY L. STEINHEIMER, JR.
THE Uniform Commercial Code was
prepared under the auspices of the
American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. These organizations
have been responsible for much of the
uniform legislation in the commercial
law area which is in effect today, e.g.,
Uniform Sales Act, Uniform Conditional
Sales Act, Uniform Trust Receipts Act,
etc. There are, however, large areas of
commercial law which are not yet cov-
ered by uniform legislation, e.g., factors
liens, accounts receivable financing, chat-
tel mortgages, etc. The code represents
an ambitious and commendable effort to
pull together most of the phases of the
law governing commercial transactions,
which are now treated in many separate
statutes, into a single statute for the
purpose of accomplishing greater uni-
formity and certainty in our commercial
law. Within its compass, the code covers
the law of (1) sales, (2) commercial
paper, (3) bank deposits and collections,
(4) letters of credit, (5) bulk transfers, Roy L. Steinheimer, Jr., is a professor at
(6) documents of title, (7) investment the University of Michigan Law School and
securities and (8) chattel secured trans- is chairman of the Special Committee To
actions. It is the culmination of years of Study The Commercial Code Of The National
study and research in these areas. Conference Of Commissioners On Uniform
At present, the code has been adopted State Laws. This article is a summary of a
At prstte censha n, a e report recently made to the members of
inusittesPen nsckylvaonncia, M a that committee by Professor Steinheimer. The
c hett Kent ChoIslnetiunew committee intends to keep members of the
Hampshire and Rhode Island. It is under Asoitnifrmd fpogesnis
stuy b iterstd gous i anumer Association informed of progress in itsstudy by interested groups in a number
studies through similar articles which willof other states including Michigan, where appear in the Journal from time to time.
a special committee of the State Bar
has undertaken the task of studying the
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code and making recommendations as
to its adoption to members of the associa-
tion.
Your committee has now completed
its study of Article 3 of the code which
deals with "commercial paper"-the area
now covered by the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law.1 The following is a summary
of the results of this study.
Under the code, negotiable instru-
ments are referred to as "commercial
paper.'" A careful distinction is drawn
between such paper and "investment
securities," which are securities normally
traded on securities markets. This dis-
tinction becomes significant in the case
of government and corporate bonds
which presently are subject to the rigid
and often unsatisfactory requirements of
the NIL.2 Under the code, government
and corporate bonds would be governed
by the provisions of the code relating
to investment securities, which are bet-
ter adopted to the actual use and opera-
tion of these instruments in commerce
than the provisions of the NIL.
As to the formal requisites of negoti-
able instruments, the code would make
no startling changes in our present law.
The code would simply serve to clear
up some of the uncertainties which have
developed under the NIL as to the effect
of references in the instrument to another
document executed in the same trans-
action, 4 of acceleration clauses,5 etc., on
negotiability of the instrument.
The code would make an important
contribution in clarifying the operation
and effect of restrictive indorsements on
negotiable instruments. Under the NIL,
1. Hereinafter referred to as "NIL."
2. See, for example, City of Adrian v.
Whitney Central National Bank, 180 Mich.
171 (1914); Paepke v. Paine, 253 Mich.
636 (1931).
3. UCC, Article 8.
4. See, for example, Ivory v. Lamoreaux,
241 Mich. 226 (1928); First State Savings
Bank v. Russell, 244 Mich. 298 (1928);
Dart National Bank v. Burton, 258 Mich.
283 (1932): Toledo Scale Co. v. Gogo, 186
Mich. 442 (1915).
5. First National Bank of Port Huron v.
Carson, 60 Mich. 432 (1886).
a restrictive indorsee cannot acquire
status as a holder in due course 6 and it
is not clear what obligations a remote
holder of the instrument owes to the re-
strictive indorser. Under the code, one
would not be prevented from attaining
status as a holder in due course simply
because he took under a restrictive in-
dorsement.7 In the commonest type of
restrictive indorsement situation-deposit
or collection-the code would make it
clear that "intermediary" banks acting as
agents in the collection process would
not be responsible to the restrictive in-
dorser for improper handling of the pro-
ceeds of collection by one of the other
agents acting in the collection process.
8
Also, an "intermediary" or "payor" bank
would not be liable in conversion solely
because the proceeds of a restrictively
indorsed item were not paid or applied
consistently with the terms of the
indorsement.9
The qualifications for status as a holder
in due course would remain substantially
the same under the code. Some slight re-
vision in approach is, however, involved.
The present requirement that a holder
in due course must take an instrument
which is "complete and regular on its
face," 10 would become a problem of
"notice" in connection with the require-
ment of "good faith" under the code. A
holder would be on notice of a defense
or claim if the instrument was so in-
complete or irregular "as to call into
question its validity, terms or ownership,
or to create an ambiguity as to the party
to pay." 11 The present requirement that
the holder in due course must take the
instrument "before it was overdue" 12
would also become a question of "notice"
for purposes of good faith purchase un-
der the code. The holder would be re-
quired to take "without notice that it
6. NIL §§37 and 47 (Mich. Comp. Laws,




10. NIL §52 (Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948,
§439.52).
11. UCC §3-304 (1) (a).
12. NIL §52 (Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948,
§439.52).
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is overdue." 13 This change would be
helpful in cases of innocent purchase of
instruments after acceleration of the
stated maturity date. The rule as to
"stale" demand instruments for purposes
of purchase before maturity would re-
main the same except that the code pro-
vides a presumption that a domestic
check is "stale" thirty days after issue. 14
As to the rights of holders in due
course, the code would make several
minor changes. Under Michigan law,
a holder in due course takes subject to
the defense of fraud in the execution
except where the party signing the in-
strument was grossly negligent. 15 The
code would shift the emphasis from gross
negligence to ordinary negligence.,16 The
NIL draws a distinction between the de-
fense of non-delivery of a complete in-
strument and of an incomplete instru-
ment. Non-delivery of an incomplete in-
strument is a good defense against a
holder in due course; non-delivery of a
complete instrument is not.17 The code
would allow the holder in due course
to take free of the defense of non-de-
livery in any case.' s
Section 3-307 (1) of the code would
replace Michigan court rule 291 dealing
with the problem of burden of establish-
ing signatures on negotiable instruments.
It is not clear whether rule 29 goes to
all signatures on the instrument which
are not specifically denied in the plead-
ing or only to the signature of the de-
fendant. The code provision expressly
covers all signatures on the instrument.
The code also goes further than rule
29 by giving claimant the benefit of a
prima facie presumption that the signa-
ture is genuine even after the signature
is challenged except where the claim
13. UCC §3-30 2(c).
14. UCC §3-304 (3) (c).
15. Van Slyke v. Rooks, 181 Mich. 88
(1914).
16. UCC §3-305 (2)(c).
17. NIL §§15 and 16 (Mich. Comp.
Laws, 1948, §§439.17 and 439.18).
18. UCC §3-115.
19. Honigman, Michigan Court Rules An-
notated 292 (1949). See also, Mich. Comp.
Laws (1948) §670.26.
is against a signer who died or became
incompetent before the proof was re-
quired.20
Unlike the NIL, the code specifically
covers the problem of instruments made
payable to impostors. 21 It would shift
the risk of loss in these situations more
definitely on the person drawing such
instruments than is presently the case.
22
The code would make several impor-
tant changes in the rules relating to al-
tered instruments. The NIL completely
"avoids" an altered instrument in the
hands of any holder other than a holder
in due course.23 Under the code, an or-
dinary holder could enforce any con-
tract on the instrument which had not
been changed by the alteration. The
code thus importantly shifts the emphasis
from avoidance of the whole instrument
to avoidance only of the particular con-
tract which has actually been altered.
24
Under the NIL, the drastic consequences
of alteration follow regardless of whether
the alteration is fraudulent. 25 Under the
code, the question of whether the altera-
tion was fraudulently made would be
material. If fraudulent, only a holder
in due course could enforce the altered
contract according to its original tenor.
If not fraudulent, any holder could en-
force the altered contract according to
its original tenor.2 6 At present, negli-
gence in drawing the instrument in a
form which invites alteration does not
affect the operation of the rules relating
to altered instruments.27 The code would
make such negligence a material fact
and, if it was found that the negligence
substantially contributed to the altera-
20. See Hunter v. Parsons, 22 Mich. 95
(1870) and Matteson v. Morris, 40 Mich.
52 (1879).
21. UCC §3-405.
22. See Peninsular, State Bank v. First
National Bank, 245 Mich. 179 at 181 (1928).
23. NIL §124 (Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948,
§439.126).
24. UCC §3-407(2).
25. Cf. Aldrich v. Smith, 37 Mich. 468
(1877) with Johnson v. Johnson Estate,
66 Mich. 525 (1887).
26. UCC §3-407(2).
27. Commonwealth Bank v. Dunn, 335
Mich. 665 (1953).
MICHIGAN STATE BAR JOURNAL
tion, the person drawing it would be
estopped to deny liability to a holder in
due course on the instrument in its
altered form.28 Under the code, unau-
thorized completion of an incomplete
instrument would constitute material al-
teration.
2 9
The code provides that "no considera-
tion is necessary for an instrument or
obligation thereon given in payment of
or as security for an antecedent obliga-
tion of any kind." This would change ex-
isting Michigan law. For example, if A,
who is indebted to B, induces C gratuit-
ously to furnish his (C's) note for use
as collateral security for A's debt, C's
note is without consideration and cannot
be enforced by one not a holder in due
course. 30 Under the code, consideration
is unnecessary and C's note would be
enforceable against him.31 Also, if A is
indebted to B on a note which C is in-
duced to sign gratuitously after delivery
of the note to B, C's promise lacks con-
sideration and cannot be enforced against
him by one not a holder in due course.
3 2
Under the code, since C's promise need
not be supported by consideration, it
would be enforceable against him.
33
Under the code, the subject of ac-
ceptance of drafts would be greatly sim-
plified. Only an acceptance "written on
the draft" would be effective.3 4 Problems
with extrinsic,35 virtual36 and construc-
tive acceptances 37 would be eliminated.
As to accommodation parties, section
3-415 of the code would eliminate the
28. UCC §3-406.
29. UCC §3-407(1).
30. Brown v. Smedley, 136 Mich. 65
(1904).
31. UCC §3-408.
32. Manistee National Bank v. Seymour,
64 Mich. 59 (1887); Kulenkamp v. Groff,
71 Mich. 675 (1888).
33. UCC §3-408.
34. UCC §3-410.
35. NIL §134 (Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948,
§439.136).
36. NIL §135 (Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948,
§439.137). Wilson & Co. v. Niffenegger,
211 Mich. 311 (1920).
37. NIL §137 (Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948,
§439.139).
present requirement that the accommo-
dation party must sign "without receiving
value."38 The code also makes it clear
that an accommodation party cannot as-
sert the defense of lack of consideration
against any bolder of the instrument.3 9
The code further specifically provides
that when an accommodation party pays
pursuant to his contract, he shall have
a right or recourse on the instrument
against the accommodated party.
The NIL makes no mention of the
obligations and rights of a guarantor of
a negotiable instrument. This subject is
specifically covered in the code 40 in a
fashion which is generally in accord with
existing Michigan law.41 The liability of
a guarantor of payment would be prac-
tically indistinguishable from that of a
primary party to the instrument. A
guarantor of collection would be liable
only after the holder had reduced his
claim to judgment against the primary
party and execution was returned un-
satisfied.
The subject of warranties of vendors
of negotiable instruments is thoroughly
reworked by the code to the end of
greater clarity and certainty.42 Vague
language now found in the warranty sec-
tions of the NIL, e.g., that the "instru-
ment is . . . in all respects what it pur-
ports to be," that the "instrument is...
valid and subsisting," etc., is eliminated.
Warranties against forged signatures, al-
tered instruments, defenses, etc., are
clearly spelled out.
There has been considerable doubt
whether the rule of Price v. Neal43 was
38. NIL §29 (Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948,
§439.31).
39. Cf. Columbia Motor Truck & Trailer
Co. v. Bamlet, 227 Mich. 651 (1924);
Krause v. Retty, 254 Mich. 684 (1931).
40. UCC §3-416.
41. National Security & Trust Co. v. Niles
Invisible Door Check Co., 222 Mich. 510
(1923); Aldrich v. Chubb, 35 Mich. 350
(1877); Barman v. Carhartt, 10 Mich. 338
(1862); Thomas v. Dodge, 8 Mich. 51
(1860).
42. Cf. NIL §§65 and 66 (Mich. Comp.
Laws, 1948, §§439.67 and 439.68) with
UCC §3-417(2)(3) and (4).
43. 3 Burr. 1354 (1762).
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actually codified by the NIL. The code
clearly incorporates the rule with little
significant change in Michigan law indi-
cated. 44 In eases of mistake in payment
involving forged indorsements45 and al-
tered instruments, 46 the Michigan courts
have allowed recovery by the payor on
theories of quasi-contract. Under the
code, one who presents for payment
would warrant that no indorsement neces-
sary to his title had been forged and that
the instrument had not been materially
altered. The code would thus simply
change the theory of payor's recovery
from quasi-contract to breach of war-
ranty. This change does not, however,
contemplate any reallocation of the
risks of loss.
While the code eliminates the con-
cept of constructive acceptance, it does
provide that a person to whom an in-
strument is delivered for acceptance or
payment shall be liable in conversion
for failure to return the instrument on
demand. 47 It protects one who acts in
a representative capacity in handling the
instrument from a claim for conversion
(except for proceeds still in hand) where
the representative dealt with the instru-
ment or its proceeds in good faith on be-
half of one not the true owner thereof.
48
This would change Michigan law.49 The
code provision that an instrument is con-
verted when it is paid on a forged in-
dorsement, would also change Michigan
law.50
The provisions of the code relating to
presentment, notice of dishonor and pro-
test would greatly simplify and clarify
existing law. As to the necessity of pre-
sentment and notice of dishonor, the
code would work one significant change
in Michigan law. Under the NIL, failure
44. UCC §3-417(1).
45. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. First
Natl. Bank, 261 Mich. 450 (1933).
46. Little v. Derby, 7 Mich. 325 (1859).
47. UCC §3-419(1).
48. UCC §3-419(3).
49. Kaufman v. State Savings Bank, 151
Mich. 65 (1908).
50. Gordon Fireworks Co. v. Capital Na-
tional Bank, 236 Mich. 271 (1926).
to present instruments payable at a bank
does not result in discharge of the maker
or acceptor.51 The only effect is that a
tender of payment is accomplished if, in
fact, the maker or acceptor was willing
and able to pay it. Under the code, if
the instrument is payable at a bank,
failure to present or give notice of dis-
honor could result in discharge of the
maker or acceptor. 52 The code would
limit the necessity of protest to situations
involving drafts "drawn or payable out-
side of the states and territories of the
United States and the District of
Columbia."
Under the NIL, delay in presentment
or notice of dishonor results in complete
discharge of drawers of drafts and in-
dorsers of any instrument.5 3 Delay in
presentment results in discharge of
drawers of checks only to the extent of
the loss caused by the delay.54 Under the
code, any indorser would still be com-
pletely discharged by delay in present-
ment or notice of dishonor. 55 But all
other parties as to whom presentment
and notice of dishonor are necessary
would be discharged only if the delay
deprived them of funds maintained to
pay the instrument and only if a written
assignment of the right to these funds is
given to the holder of the instrument. 56
Unlike the NIL, this change properly
ties discharge to actual injury suffered by
the delay in presentment or notice of
dishonor.
As to time for presentment for pay-
ment, the code explicitly provides that
if the maturity date of an instrument is
accelerated, presentment must be made
"within a reasonable time after the ac-
celeration." 57 The NIL is silent on this
51. NIL §70 (Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948,
§439.72).
52. UCC §3-501(1).
53. See NIL §70 (Mich. Comp. Laws,
1948, §439.72).
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problem. Presentment as to secondary
parties on demand instruments would be
required within a reasonable time after
the secondary party becomes liable on
the instrument. 5s That is, drawers of de-
mand drafts and checks would require
presentment within a reasonable time
after issue and indorsers of demand in-
struments would require presentment
within a reasonable time after indorse-
ment. The rather unsatisfactory "last
negotiation" rule of the NIL would be
eliminated. 5'9 The code creates a pre-
sumption with regard to uncertified
checks that 30 days after issue is reason-
able for presentment as to the drawer
and seven days after indorsement is rea-
sonable for presentment as to each in-
dorser.
The methods of presentment now cov-
ered by various sections of the NIL 60
are simplified by the provisions of sec-
tion 3-504 of the code.
Section 3-508 of the code would
liberalize the rules as to who can give
effective notice of dishonor. It would
eliminate present distinctions based on
place of residence of the persons in-
volved as to the methods of giving notice
of dishonor.
As to protest, the rules as to persons
authorized to make protest are liberal-
ized and it would no longer need be
made at the place of dishonor.6 1 In Mich-
igan, a certificate of protest by a notary
public is presumptive evidence of the
facts contained therein. 62 However, the
presumption can be overcome by verified
pleading denying the facts. Under the
code, the document of protest would
create a presumption of dishonor and
notice thereof which could be rebutted
58. UCC §3-503(1)(e).
59. NIL §71 (Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948,
§439.73).
60. NIL §72 (Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948,
§439.74); §73 (Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948,
§439.75); §77 (Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948,
§439.79); §78 (Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948,
§439.80); §145 (Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948,
§439.147).
61. UCC §3-509.
62. Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948, §55.113.
only by the introduction of evidence
sufficient to support a finding that notice
of dishonor had not been given.
63
Section 3-511 of the code greatly sim-
plifies the present provisions of the NIL
relating to waiver and excuse of present-
ment, notice of dishonor and protest.
On the subject of discharge, the code
would make several important changes
and clarifications of provisions of the
NIL. For example, the NIL provides for
discharge of the instrument64 and dis-
charge of parties to the instrument.
6'
The code provides only for discharge of
parties to the instrument. However, the
liability of all parties to an instrument
would be discharged in the event of pay-
ment or reacquisition of the instrument by
one who himself has "no right of action
or recourse on the instrument," e.g., the
maker of a promissory note.66  The
troublesome term "principal debtor,"
used without definition in the NIL, is
eliminated. The code specifically spells
out the effect which the accommodation
relationship should have upon problems
of discharge of parties to the instrument.
Unlike the NIL, the code makes it clear
that typical suretyship defenses are avail-
able to accommodation makers and ac-
ceptors as well to secondary parties.
67
The concept of "payment in due course'
is eliminated. The rules as to cancella-
tion and renunciation are clarified.
In conclusion, it seems fair to say that
the code does an excellent job of over-
hauling a statute which has long been
in need of revision. After all, the NIL
was drafted over 60 years ago. It was
adopted in Michigan in 1905. In the
half century since its adoption, it has
ceased to be a uniform law because of
amendments added in many states and
differing constructions given to its pro-
visions by the courts of various states.
The code could reestablish uniformity.
63. UCC §3-510.
64. NIL §199 (Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948,
§439.121).
65. NIL §120 (Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948,
§439.122).
66. UCC §3-601.
67. UCC §3-606.
